How to Lose the Civil War: Military Mistakes of the War Between the States

How to Lose the Civil War: Military Mistakes of the War Between the States

Bill Fawcett

Language: English

Pages: 186

ISBN: 0061807273

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


“Fawcett rivals Jim Dunnigan as a general-audience military analyst.”
Publishers Weekly

An expert on historical military incompetence, Bill Fawcett now offers an engrossing, fact-filled collection that sheds light on the biggest, dumbest screw ups of the America’s bloodiest conflict. How to Lose the Civil War is a fascinating compendium of battlefield blunders and strategic mistakes on both sides of the line. History and military buffs, trivia lovers, and students of the War Between the States will all be mesmerized by this amazing collection of gaffes and bungles perpetrated by idiot officers and short-sighted politicians, Union and Confederate alike— published on the 150th anniversary of the brutal conflict that changed America forever.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

should. Ours is an agricultural people, and God grant that we may continue so.” The Confederate cabinet was composed of men who firmly believed in the power of cotton. Withholding it was their only plan to secure foreign recognition and assistance. When the navy blockaded the southern ports, Richmond called it a “paper blockade” and fully expected the British navy to appear and disperse it. They were shocked when Whitehall agreed to respect it. To avoid the appearance of provocation, Richmond

Parte Merriman and Ex Parte Milligan) have painted the nineteenth-century president of the United States as a savvy lawyer who knew the limits of his abilities, the poorly handled Vallandigham case paints Lincoln as both a dupe for allowing Burnside to act as well as a hypocrite for pardoning a man his own system validated as dangerous. Above all, the case also serves as a palpable reminder of the boundlessness of alleged wartime necessity and national security. Chapter 12 Against a Rock and a

rest of the war. By March 1864, Ulysses S. Grant would replace Halleck as general-in-chief of the Union Army, and under his leadership, the final blows would be struck to bring the Confederacy down once and for all. But why weren’t the other generals able to defeat Lee’s seemingly (at least until Gettysburg) unstoppable army? In the case of McClellan and Halleck, the answer is obvious—both men could handle localized military actions where the goal was clearly identified, but the pressure of

ranged from 20,000 to 28,000, roughly one-third of Lee’s force. (Casualties represent the total number of troops not available due to all losses. At Gettysburg, the Union lost 3,185 killed, 14,529 wounded, and 5,365 missing, while Confederate losses were 3,903 killed, 18,735 wounded, and 5,425 missing. Death rates for the wounded in the Civil War averaged about 14 percent.) Meade had spent a good part of the battle busting up corps and divisions to fill his line and avert crisis. Those units

The generals continued to lead. The soldiers continued to bleed. Chapter 34 The South’s Last Stand on the Gulf August 1864: Mobile Bay, Alabama John Helfers By 1864, the Anaconda plan was working better in some areas than in others. Grant’s brilliant campaign to take the Mississippi River in the west had cut the Confederacy in two, preventing supplies from reaching the beleaguered states east of the river. The blockade in the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Ocean was less successful, as fast

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