Kant and the Ends of Aesthetics
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The importance and significance of Kant's aesthetics has been widely debated. This work presents an original interpretation of Kant's account which is based on rethinking the nature of Critical Philosophy. Gary Banham presents the argument that the Critique of Judgement needs to be read as a whole. Aesthetics is investigated in relation to all three critiques with the recovery of a larger sense of the aesthetic resulting. This broader notion of aesthetics is connected to the recovery of the critique of teleology in an original presentation of Kant's critical enterprise as constituted by the attempt to think the meaning of ends.
included under the heading of the Transcendental Analytic). At this point we need to refer again to the two forms of judgment and re-examine their mode of operation. As Kant puts it, `in the power of judgment we consider understanding and imagination as they relate to each other' (Ak. 20:223) and this can be done in two ways. When we consider understanding and imagination as belonging to the cognition of an object, then we have the transcendental schematism. But when we consider them `insofar as
Reason. I will also show the connections between the Deduction and the Transcendental Aesthetic, the connection of both to the Schematism, and how the Analytic of the Aesthetic of reflective judgment recasts the relationships between understanding, imagination and judgment. The Different Senses of `Imagination' Before turning to a reading of the A-Deduction it will be instructive to look at the different ways Kant uses the term `imagination'. He introduces reference to it in the first chapter of
that the latter becomes intellectual. `For since the synthesis of imagination connects the manifold only as it appears in intuition . . . it is, though exercised a priori, always in itself sensible' (A124). It is now that Kant tells us that what the imagination does that is truly indispensable is to bring into relation the manifold of intuition and the unity of pure apperception. It thus mediates between sensibility and the transcendental understanding. Thus we have discovered in the A-Deduction
committed to the view that there is in fact no such thing as an antinomy of judgment (just antinomies of reason) and, also like Schrader, argues that there is no problem if both principles are taken to be regulative. However, he successfully avoids the deep entanglements Schrader gets into about the relation between the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Teleological Judgment, by stating that it is not the case (as Schrader assumes) that the thesis is asserting the category of causality
distinction between empirical togetherness and the holding together of the empirical within the transcendental replicates the relation between transcendental and reproductive syntheses of imagination. In addition to this account of community in the First Critique we can, in turning to the Second Critique, find a parallel discussion. The presentation of the categories of freedom includes as the third determination of relation the reciprocal relation of each person to the condition of others and