Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement: The Shocking True Story of the Military Intelligence Failure at Pearl Harbor and the Fourteen Men Responsible for the Disaster
Bruce Lee, Henry C. Clausen
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“We might have possessed the genius to break the Purple code, but in 1941 we didn’t have the brains to know what to do with it.” —Henry C. Clausen, special investigator for secretary of war Henry L. Stimson
On December 6, 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, assured his staff that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor. The next morning, Japanese carriers steamed toward Hawaii to launch one of the most devastating surprise attacks in the history of war, proving the admiral disastrously wrong. Immediately, an investigation began into how the American military could have been caught so unaware.
The results of the initial investigation failed to implicate who was responsible for this intelligence debacle. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, realizing that high-ranking members of the military had provided false testimony, decided to reopen the investigation by bringing in an unknown major by the name of Henry C. Clausen. Over the course of ten months, from November 1944 to September 1945, Clausen led an exhaustive investigation. He logged more than fifty-five thousand miles and interviewed over one hundred military and civilian personnel, ultimately producing an eight-hundred-page report that brought new evidence to light. Clausen left no stone unturned in his dogged effort to determine who was truly responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor.
Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement reveals all of the eye-opening details of Clausen’s investigation and is a damning account of massive intelligence failure. To this day, the story surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor stokes controversy and conspiracy theories. This book provides conclusive evidence that shows how the US military missed so many signals and how it could have avoided the events of that fateful day.
Harbor Board. 1. Since 1 August 1945 I have concluded the investigations of the following: a. Army Personnel interviewed: General George C. Marshall Major General Charles D. Herron Major General Sherman Miles Colonel Otis K. Sadtler Colonel George W. Bicknell Colonel Rex W. Minckler Colonel Harold Doud Colonel Harold G. Hayes Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett b. British Army personnel interviewed: Colonel Gerald Wilkinson c. Civilians interviewed: Miss Mary J. Dunning Miss Louise
received by the addressee in Hawaii. Furthermore, the cross-checking system used by the Signal Corps showed that the Hawaiian Department on that day had sent its usual confirming message accounting for all the cable traffic it received each day by referring to the numbers assigned the messages. This showed that no repeat transmission was necessary for message number 519, meaning the message had been received by Hawaii. So far as Washington G-2 was concerned, message number 519 of December 5 had
information to Bicknell without revealing its sources. (Perhaps Fielder was mixed up, because Layton testified that he met Bicknell only once.) “The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend Pearl Harbor Naval base,” Fielder said. He pointed out that the Army’s Seventh Air Force was the only Army unit capable of long-range defensive action, and that Colonel Raley was in liaison with Captain Layton about the matter, and that he had sworn Raley to secrecy
That person was, of course, Fielder. The more professional, job-oriented Bicknell was considered a bit uncouth to be Mrs. Short’s companion. Such were the problems of the peacetime Army of 1941. I have often wondered why no historian ever probed more deeply into the subject. Only Gordon Prange, who wrote the best-selling At Dawn We Slept, ever interviewed me, and he never asked a single question about my views of the readiness of the Hawaiian command to resist a surprise Japanese attack. But
later, a second atomic weapon destroyed Nagasaki. That same day, August 9, the Russians invaded Manchuria, and the Japanese Supreme Council for the Conduct of the War convened to discuss the severity of the situation facing Japan. The Russian invasion of Manchuria was of greater concern to the Council, because the enormity of the disaster caused by the atomic bomb at Hiroshima had not yet been grasped by the Japanese government. The military members of the Supreme Council still argued that Japan